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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DON WEILER BENNION, Executor 
of the Estate of Heber Bennion, Jr., 
VERA W. BENNION and 
BENNION RANCHING COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
DUDLEY M. AMOSS and DIANA 
M. AMOSS, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
DAGGETT COUNTY DEVELOP-
MENT CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Applicant for Intervention 
and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants-Appellants filed a motion in the District 
Court of Daggett County to vacate a foreclosure sale held 
on December 15, 1972, The redemptioner, Daggett 
County Development Corporation, filed a motion to inter-
vene and join in the motion to vacate the sale. 
Case No. 
13551 
1 
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DISPOSITION I N THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court denied both the motion of Amoss 
to vacate the foreclosure sale and the motion of Daggett 
County Development Corporation to intervene. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal and remand to the lower 
court, with directions to permit Daggett County Develop-
ment Corporation to intervene as a defendant, to vacate 
the foreclosure sale and to enter judgment for Appellants 
for certain amounts claimed to have been paid to redeem 
the property from such foreclosure sale in excess of that 
required to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is the fifth time this Court has been called upon 
to settle differences in regard to the problems arising out 
of the transactions involving the contract entered into 
between Appellant Dudley M. Amoss and Respondents' 
predecessor, Heber Bennion, on August 12, 1964. The 
most recent decision of this Court was rendered Decem-
ber 27, 1973. Prior decisions are Amoss v. Bennion, 18 
Utah 2d 251, 420 P.2d 47 (1966); Amoss v. Bennion, 23 
Utah 2d 40, 456 P.2d 172 (1969); and Bennion v. Amoss, 
28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d 512 (1972). 
Additional facts which have significance to the in-
stant matter are detailed below. 
This instant case commenced as an action to fore-
close a mortgage. After a considerable amount of legal 
2 
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stalling and delay on the part of Appellants Amoss, as the 
record discloses, before their present counsel became in-
volved in the case, Respondents were successful in obtain-
ing a summary judgment on their complaint and a decree 
of foreclosure on the property. Appellants thereupon 
appealed to this Court which affirmed the decision of the 
lower court and sent the matter back for further proceed-
ings. (28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d 512) 
On November 20, 1972, the trial court duly entered 
an amended decree of foreclosure (R. 14) and an order 
of sale (R. 7). The sheriff's sale was set for December 15, 
1972. (Tr. 3) 
Appellants then filed a motion to postpone the fore-
closure sale, alleging as grounds therefor that Appellants 
had not been given sufficient notice of the entry of the 
amended decree; that the amended decree of foreclosure 
failed to provide that the mortgaged premises be divided 
and sold in parcels; that it failed to apportion equitably 
among the parcels of property the 800 shares of stock in 
the Sheep Creek Irrigation Company; that Appellants 
were prepared to pay the amount owing if given addi-
tional time to do it; and that the holding of the foreclosure 
sale on December 15, 1972, instead of December 27, 1972, 
* 'would not afford the Respondents any greater protec-
tion with respect to the mortgaged indebtedness, but 
would require Defendants to pay a penalty of approxi-
mately $7,600.00 in order to redeem the property after the 
mortgage sale." (R. 32) 
Respondents' counsel filed an affidavit in opposition 
to the motion in which the facts with respect to the num-
3 
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erous delays, particularly following the decision of this 
Court, were outlined. (R. 23) Among other facts, the 
affidavit disclosed that Appellants had been given the 
opportunity to satisfy the judgment from the date of this 
Court's decision in September until December when the 
sale was scheduled. (R. 20-23) 
After hearing Appellants' motion, the trial court 
denied the same (R. 33); and the sale proceeded as adver-
tised on December 15, 1972, at which time Respondents 
purchased the property for $128,550.00, being the amount 
of the mortgage indebtedness, including interest, attorneys 
fees and costs to the date of purchase. (R. 99) 
At some time during this period Appellants Amoss 
(mortgagors) transferred their interest in the property to 
Daggett County Development Corporation. (R. 99) Later, 
at the hearing on the motion to vacate the foreclosure 
sale, Respondents contended that such transfer was made 
before the sheriff's sale of the property; whereas, Appel-
lants claimed that such transfer was made subsequent to 
the sheriff's sale. (Tr. 26-34) In any event, it is undisputed 
that Appellants Amoss did, in fact, transfer all of their 
right, title and interest in the property to Daggett County 
Development Corporation prior to the redemption by 
Daggett County Development Corporation from the sher-
iff's sale and that Appellants Amoss therefore have had 
no interest in the matter since prior to December 29, 
1972. (Tr. 5) 
On December 29, 1972, Daggett County Develop-
ment Corporation presented satisfactory evidence of its 
4 
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ownership of all the rights of the Appellants Amoss to re-
deem the property as permitted by Rule 69(f)(1), U.R.C.P., 
and paid to the Plaintiffs the sum of $138,691.56 as and 
for the redemption of said property, which amount includ-
ed the 6% penalty on the purchase price, together with 
taxes and other costs which had been paid by the Plain-
tiffs subsequent to the purchase !>\ rhem at the sheriff's 
sale. (R. 99) 
Thereafter, on January V\ 1-^3, Appellants Amoss 
filed in the lower court a nin^'on to xaauv the foreclosure 
siile, (R. 98) This motion was heard by ih*. court in Utah 
County by agreement of counsel (TV 1 ^ *>ti April 26„ 1973. 
In the interim, Daggett County Development Corpo-
ration filed a motion to intervene in the case in place of the 
Defendants Amoss and in support thereof submitted a 
memorandum of authorities to the court, (R 98) 
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to 
vacate the foreclosure sale, the court extended to counsel 
the opportunity to file briefs on their respective positions. 
(Tr.34) 
After considering the respective briefs, the lower 
court denied Appellants' Motion to Vacate Foreclosure 
Sale on the following grounds: 
"(a) The record, including motion to vacate fore-
closure sale, does not contain sufficient ultimate 
facts to require the court to vacate the sale in the 
exercise of its sound discretion. Two of the grounds 
set forth in the motion have been ruled upon pre-
viously, and there does not appear to be any com-
pelling reason to modify that ruling. The remain-
5 
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der are irregularities which may or may not have 
prejudiced the defendant, depending upon the evi-
dence, but in any event, the court holds that they 
were waived by the redemption. 
"(b) There is some merit in bringing litigation to 
an end, and the court believes that more mischief 
and inequity would result from setting aside the 
sale than is alleged to have resulted from irregu-
larities in the sale." (R. 101) 
The lower court also denied the motion of Daggett 
County Development Corporation to intervene as a de-
fendant on the ground that there was no pending action 
in which to intervene. (R. 101) 
ISSUES 
Appellants have raised three issues in their brief 
which Respondents will answer under the following head-
ings: 
1. Appellants' Motion and the evidence in support 
thereof were insufficient to justify granting relief. 
2. The property having been redeemed from the sher-
iff's sale, any irregularities in the sale have been waived 
and the matter is now moot. 
3. The motion of Daggett County Development 
Corporation to intervene was properly denied. 
In addition, Respondents submit an additional point 
numbered 4 to the effect that Appellants Amoss, having 
assigned any interest they may have in the property to 
6 
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Daggett County Development Corporation, have no fur-
ther interest in the matter and therefore no cause to com-
plain. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS' MOTION AND THE EVI-
DENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF WERE IN-
SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY GRANTING RE-
LIEF. 
Appellants' motion to vacate foreclosure sale was 
founded on the following arguments: (1) lack of notice 
sufficient to interest other bidders; (2) not made in accord-
ance with law in that it was not sold in parcels; (3) the 
sheriff refused to accept a bid with 10% down and the 
balance in the future; (4) requiring the sale to be held at 
that time was oppressive and unconscionable; (5) the 
property was sold for less than its value; and (6) the prop-
erty having been redeemed, it would be equitable to re-
quire Respondents to refund the penalty required to be 
paid. 
Points (1), (4) and (6) are not raised or argued in 
Appellants' brief before this Court and therefore must be 
assumed to be waived. Points (2), (3), and (5) are with-
out merit under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
Sale in parcels. This point was argued to the lower 
court on the initial motion to continue the sale and/or 
require the property to be sold in parcels. That motion 
was denied by the court and no appeal was taken from 
such order. Therefore, the matter is now res judicata. 
7 
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In any event, in the case of Commercial Bank of Utah v. 
Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P.2d 343, (1951) this Court 
had before it the question of whether property had to be 
sold separately and held that "the fact that the land is de-
scribed as Tots 1 and 2 of Block 28, Plat A Manti City 
Survey' does not serve to make separate tracts of an other-
wise unified parcel." 
With respect to a sale as a whole as opposed to par-
cels, 55 AM. JUR. 2d, Mortgages, Section 649, pages 605-
606, states the law as follows: 
"In particular cases the sale of the property as a 
whole or in parcels has been regarded as proper or 
improper depending largely upon the state of the 
property and the circumstances. * * * Many 
cases hold that two or more tracts or lots of land 
which constitute one farm or other enterprise, or 
home, may be sold as a unit upon foreclosure of a 
mortgage covering the property." 
The Idaho Supreme Court held in Gaskill v. Neal, 
also cited by Appellant, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957, 960 
(1956), that: 
"The general rule is that where there is no division 
of the mortgaged property into parcels adapted for 
separate and distinct enjoyment, the property 
should be sold as a whole, unless the party inter-
ested should show in some intelligible manner the 
distinct manner in which the property might be 
profitably divided for sale. 37 Am. Jur., Mort-
gages, Sec. 694, p. 138. No such showing was made 
or even attempted in the case now before us." 
The court in Gaskill v. Neal also observed that: 
"In the case of Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. 
Curts, 45 Idaho 414, 262 P. 877, parcels of a farm 
8 
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had been sold separately, and the sheriff had ignor-
ed a much higher written bid for the entire tract. 
The court set aside the sale, and said, 45 Idaho at 
page 424, 262 P. at page 880: 
« <* * * Since this land is contiguous, and 
is owned and farmed as one tract, and there 
are no peculiar marks or circumstances to 
distinguish one 40-acre piece from another, 
from the standpoint of use or enjoyment, 
it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that it 
is divided into separate known lots or par-
cels, requiring the officer to sell in separate 
parcels. Elston v. Hix, supra [67 Mont. 
294, 215 P. 657] / " 
Section 651, 55 AM. JUR. 2d, Mortgages, states as 
follows with regard to discretion of officer selling the 
property: 
*'Where no direction in relation to the order or 
mode of sale is contained in the decree, the officer 
charged with its execution is vested with discre-
tionary power. Such discretionary power is sub-
ject to the control of the court, however. Where a 
discretion is vested in the trustee or other officer 
empowered to sell as a whole or in parcels, it must 
be exercised in good faith for the best interests 
of both the creditor and debtor; in other words, 
it is his duty to sell in the mode which, in the exer-
cise of a sound judgment and discretion, probably 
will be the most advantageous. 
"There are some general rules, deducible from the 
cases, for the guidance of an officer having dis-
cretionary power as to the amount of property to 
be sold under mortgage foreclosure and the mode 
of selling the property. Thus, the general rule is 
that mortgaged property which consists of several 
distinct known lots, parcels, or tracts shall be first 
9 
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offered for sale in parcels, especially where the 
debtor requests that such a mode of sale be adopt-
ed, or where the decree directs the sale of so much 
of the land as is necessary to pay the debt. But this 
rule, while a wholesome one, is not an arbitrary 
one, and should not be enforced where there is a 
valid reason for a sale of property en masse; as, 
for example, where the latter mode will insure the 
best prices and be most advantageous to all parties 
concerned, or where the separate parcels are used 
as one property and all are essential to such use, 
or where the property is first offered in parcels and 
no bids are received or those received are insuffi-
cient to pay the mortgage debt." (Emphasis added) 
As in Gaskill v. Neal, supra, no showing was made 
or even attempted in the present case that the property 
might be more profitably divided for sale or that it is 
adapted for separate and distinct enjoyment. (R. 20) 
All of the property involved comprises one con-
tiguous tract. (R. 20, 15) Prior to the time the property 
was sold to Appellants Amoss, it was operated as one 
ranching unit and was mortgaged as a unit to the Federal 
Land Bank of Berkeley, on which mortgage there is still 
a balance owing of $30,000.00. (R. 20) The property was 
sold to Appellants Amoss as one parcel or tract and Amoss 
mortgaged the same to Respondents as one entire parcel 
to secure the payment of the purchase price. (R. 20) I t 
would not be practicable to attempt to segregate said prop-
erty or to divide the same into parcels for purposes of sale 
because said property has been and is now being operated 
as one integral unit. (R. 20) 
10 
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Price. In the case of Cole v. Canton Mining Com-
pany, 59 Utah 140, 202 P. 830, the Supreme Court dis-
cussed the effect of a sale on foreclosure as follows: 
"We are not unmindful that in some jurisdictions, 
under similar circumstances, no sale could have 
been consummated until after a confirmation by 
the court ordering the sale. Such is not the prac-
tice in our jurisdiction, but sale proceedings, and 
the rights of parties under them, are fixed, and in 
the absence of gross irregularities, mistake, fraud, 
or collusion practiced on the part of the partici-
pants, a sale, when made as directed by the court, 
in compliance with the statutes, must of necessity 
be held valid and binding and the rights of all 
interested parties fixed and determined thereby." 
The court also held: 
"When a lawful sale has been once consummated 
at a price not grossly inadequate, as we think it was 
in this instance, after full compliance with the 
statutes and the orders of the court, the rights of 
redemptioners when established should be equally 
safeguarded, even though some other course might 
increase the sum for which the property is sold. 
Ontario Land Co. v. Bedford, 90 Cal. 181, 27 Pac. 
39; Marstson v. White, 91 Cal. 37, 27 Pac. 588; 
Power v. Larabee, 3 N.D. 502, 57 N.W. 789, 44 
Am. St. Rep. 577." 
Likewise, in First National Bank v. Haymond, 89 Utah 
151, 57 P.2d 1401, (1936) the court discussed the right of 
a mortgagee to have the property sold to satisfy the mort-
gage, as follows: 
"Under our laws affecting the foreclosure of 
mortgages, we can see no escape from the con-
clusion that a mortgagee is entitled to have the 
mortgaged property sold under foreclosure sale, 
11 
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and, in the event the property does not sell for 
sufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt, to have a 
deficiency judgment entered in the usual way, 
notwithstanding the value of the mortgaged prop-
erty is in excess of the debt owing to the mortgagee. 
Thus the equitable powers which the courts may 
exercise at the time of confirmation in the juris-
diction from which cases are cited by appellants 
may in this jurisdiction be exercised only after 
sale upon proper application by the party who 
claims to be injured. Moreover, to require the 
mortgagee to accept the mortgaged property in 
lieu of the money which the mortgagors have 
agreed to pay would be to make a contract for the 
parties contrary to their agreement. This the courts 
may not do. Under our statutory law the mortgagor 
and other parties interested in the mortgaged prop-
erty are given six months after sale in which to 
redeem the property sold. The redemption may be 
had by paying the sale price, together with 6 per 
cent interest thereon. R.S. Utah 1933, 104-37-31. 
These provisions are calculated to protect from 
injury the mortgagor and others who may have an 
interest in the property. If the mortgagee or other 
purchaser bids in the property for less than its 
value, such mortgagee or purchaser may be depriv-
ed of all anticipated profit by redemption. Nor is 
redemption of the mortgaged property the sole 
remedy available to the mortgagor. It is quite gen-
erally held that substantial inadequacy of price, 
coupled with fraud, mistake, or other unfair deal-
ing is sufficient to justify a court of equity from 
timelv motion to set aside the sale and order a re-
sale." 
With regard to inadequacy of price, the language 
of this Court in Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, et al, 
120 Utah 519, 522-523, 236 P.2d 343, (1951), is relevant: 
12 
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"This was not a sale between a willing buyer and 
a willing seller, where a fair price might have been 
arrived at by bargaining. There were other factors 
present: It was subject to redemption by the judg-
ment-debtor, and to possible infirmities of title. 
It is well known that purchasers at such sales are 
seeking bargains, when possible, and that such a 
sale will rarely bring the full market price of the 
property. * * * The value of the property was 
the subject of conflicting evidence, and the trial 
court made the determination that the sale price 
was 'consistent with the value of the property 
under an execution sale/ This precludes any possi-
bility whatever of this Court ruling that the price 
paid was so disproportionate to the value as to 
shock the conscience. The trial court's judgment 
that the price was not inadequate is based on com-
petent credible evidence, therefore we will not dis-
turb it." (Emphasis added) 
Also, in Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 52, 55, 337 
P.2d 429 (1959), this Court held: 
"The policy of the courts is to uphold judicial sales 
except where they are manifestly unfair. Page v. 
Commonwealth, 176 Va. 351, 11 S.E.2d 621. 
Especially is this true in a state such as Utah which 
has a substantial period of redemption. Parker v. 
Clayton, 248 Ala. 632, 29 So.2d 139. Compare 
Crane v. Bielski, 15 N.J. 342, 104 A.2d 651. This 
is because courts hope that such a policy will en-
courage bidding at judicial sales and because it ap-
pears to be a waste of time to require a new sale 
where little evidence is presented to show that the 
bid price at the new sale will be any different from 
the bid at the old. In the instant case defendant has 
presented no evidence to show that the price was 
unfair or that defendant was injured by the con-
duct of the sale. It follows that the trial court 
ruled correctly in refusing to overturn the sale." 
(Emphasis added) 
13 
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Cases cited in Appellants' brief are examples of in-
adequate prices which were so gross as to shock the con-
science. Such is not the case in the instant action. In any 
event, the amount of the purchase price at the sheriff's 
sale is immaterial because the property was redeemed. If a 
higher price had been paid, it would have required the 
payment of a larger sum, including a greater penalty, to 
have redeemed. 
Payment in cash. Appellants cite 59 C.J.S., Mort-
gages* §7321, in support of their position. However, they 
stop short in their quotation of the relevant passage: 
"In the absence of a statute or a provision in the 
mortgage to the contrary, whether or not the sale 
shall be for cash has been held to be within the 
discretion of the court, and such discretionary 
power to sell partly on credit should be exercised 
where the facts warrant such action in view of the 
interests of all parties. {End of Appellants' quota-
tion} Where the decree orders that the sale may be 
made on credit, the sheriff is not authorized to 
offer by advertisement to sell the property for cash 
only. On the other hand, unless authorized by 
statute or decree, the sale may not be made on 
credit or for anything else than lawful money." 
(Emphasis added) 
The simple fact of the matter is that the sheriff in 
the instant action was authorized neither by statute nor 
decree to sell the property in question for anything other 
than lawful money, payable immediately in cash. 
In view of the history of delays perpetrated by Ap-
pellants as represented in Plaintiffs' counsels' affidavit 
14 
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filed in the lower court (R. 23), where counsel gave Ap-
pellants every chance to produce the amount owing, from 
June, 1972, until the date of the sale, it can hardly be 
said that it would have been in the best interests of all 
parties for the sheriff to have accepted an amount in cash 
representing only 10% of the bid. 
Appellants cite authorities where sales for part credit 
have been upheld; however, these cases can be dis-
tinguished from the instant action on the facts. 
In Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Lem-
mons, 155 S.E. 591 (S.C. 1930), for example, the court 
merely recognized that a court of equity has discretionary 
power to order sale of mortgaged premises for part cash 
and part credit. 
"Distressful times" was cited as the reason for over-
turning a lower court decision requiring cash at the fore-
closure sale in the 1934 case of Federal Bank of Columbia 
v. Wells, 172 S.C 1, 172 S.E. 707. 
The facts in the instant action are such that the sher-
iff was justified in rejecting a bid of part credit and part 
cash where neither decree nor statute authorized him to 
do otherwise. 
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POINT II 
THE PROPERTY HAVING BEEN REDEEM-
ED FROM THE SHERIFF'S SALE, ANY IR-
REGULARITIES IN THE SALE HAVE BEEN 
WAIVED AND THE MATTER IS N O W 
MOOT. 
In the case of Tanner v. Laivler, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 
P.2d 791, (1957) this Court discussed the effect of a re-
demption from a sheriff's sale as follows: 
"We adhere to our holding that the provisions of 
Rule 69(f)(5) dealing with the right of a judgment 
debtor who redeems his property from the sher-
iff's sale in a foreclosure action gives him different 
rights than if he takes an assignment of the sher-
iff's sale certificates. Under the above provisions 
of Rule 69(f)(5), had Reichert redeemed from the 
sheriff's sale as a judgment debtor and as successor 
of the interest of the Lawlers, the effect of the fore-
closure sale would have terminated." 
The general effect of a redemption as stated in 47 
AM. JUR. 2d, Judicial Sales, §348, p . 572, by the judg-
ment debtor or his successor "restores the property to the 
same condition as if no sale had been attempted." 
See, also, Rule 69(f)(5), U.R.C.P., which states in 
part: 
"If the debtor redeems the effect of the sale is 
terminated and he is restored to his estate. Upon 
a redemption by the debtor, the person to whom 
the payment is made must execute and deliver to 
him a certificate of redemption, duly acknowl-
edged." 
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With respect to waiver or estoppel, Section 400 of 47 
AM. JUR. 2d, Judicial Sales, states the law as follows: 
"Persons interested in a judicial sale or the prop-
erty sold may by disclaimer waive defects in such 
sale, even as to its fraudulent character, and there-
by estop themselves from later challenging its va-
lidity. As a general rule, any act of participation 
by one for whose benefit the sale is made which 
shows approval of or acquiescence in the proceed-
ings for the sale of land, including such an act by 
the beneficiaries of the decedent in cases involving 
an executor's or administrator's sale, may, under 
the conditions necessary to invoke waiver or estop-
pel, preclude him from challenging the validity of 
the sale for defects short of those which would 
render it a complete legal nullity. * * * Thus, an 
heir who assents to a sale under a void decree, and 
acts as one of the commissioners thereat, passes 
in equity a good title to his share. Included in such 
conduct is bidding, or redemption of or an attempt 
to redeem the property.99 (Emphasis added) (47 
AM. JUR. 2d, Judicial Sales, p. 611) 
Cases cited in support of this statement include Hoi-
comb v. Boynton, 151 111. 294, 37 N.E. 1031; Miller v. 
Ayers, 59 Iowa 424, 13 N.W. 436, holding that one who 
deposited the amount of the debt in the clerk's office 
prior to the expiration of the period of redemption affirm-
ed the validity of the sale insofar as his redemption rights 
depended on a determination of that question. 
Also, in the case of French v. Kemp, 253 Mass. 75, 
148 N.E. 422, the court held that where a redemption of 
the property has taken place, the person redeeming is 
estopped from asserting any invalidity to the sale. 
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Respondents further contend that the action of Ap-
pellants Amoss' successor in interest in redeeming the 
property from the sale which had brought a sufficient sum 
to satisfy the amount owing so that no deficiency judg-
ment was entered constituted a complete satisfaction of the 
judgment and the matter was and now remains moot. 
A case illustrating this point is Dawson v. Board of 
Education of Weber County, 118 Utah 452, 222 P.2d 590, 
where the plaintiff brought an action against the Board 
of Education of Weber County and certain individuals 
to recover for damages suffered by him by reason of the 
unlawful death of his nine-year-old son. Judgment was 
entered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant Carr 
after a jury verdict, but in favor of the defendant Bing-
ham and against plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon ap-
pealed from the judgment insofar as the defendant Bing-
ham was concerned but subsequent to the judgment ac-
cepted payment from the defendant Carr for the amount 
of the judgment rendered against him. On motion to dis-
miss the appeal, the Supreme Court stated (quoting from 
AM. JUR., Vol. 31, paragraph 873): 
"The general rule is that actual payment of a judg-
ment in full to a person authorized to receive it 
operates as a discharge thereof whether the pay-
ment is made by the judgment debtor himself or 
by one of several judgment debtors, or by another 
in his behalf. This rule prevails at law." 
Seer also, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 4, Sec. 
886. 
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Respondents further contend that by redeeming the 
property from the sheriff's sale, the Appellants' successor 
in interest accepted the benefits of the judgment and there-
fore cannot complain of it. It is well recognized that a 
party cannot accept the benefits of a judgment or decision 
and then appeal from it. See 4 AM. JUR. 2d, Appeal & 
Error, Section 250, where the following appears: 
"A party who accepts an award or legal advantage 
under an order, judgment, or decree ordinarily 
waives his right to any such review of the jurisdic-
tion as may again put in issue his right to the bene-
fit which he has accepted. This is so even though 
the judgment, decree, or order may have been gen-
erally unfavorable to the appellant." 
We see no way that Appellant Amoss can now complain 
of the sale, in view of the foregoing. 
POINT III 
THE MOTION OF DAGGETT COUNTY DE-
VELOPMENT CORPORATION TO INTER-
VENE WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
What has been heretofore stated with respect to the 
merits of the motion to set aside the sheriff's sale apply 
with equal force to Daggett County Development Corpo-
ration as to Appellants Amoss. In addition, Daggett 
County Development Corporation has failed to establish 
any basis for intervention. 
As stated by counsel for Daggett County Develop-
ment Corporation in his brief, intervention in an action 
is governed by Rule 24, U.R.C.P. However, there was and 
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is no action pending before the court in which interven-
tion is possible. The matter has been completely adjudi-
cated, the property sold and redeemed and as stated here-
tofore, the judgment satisfied. If the Development Corpo-
ration, after taking an assignment from Appellants Amoss 
of their interest in the property, had any objection to the 
amount which it was required to pay to redeem, it could 
have followed the procedure outlined in Rule 69(f)(3) 
which authorizes the person seeking redemption to "pay 
the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in 
dispute, to the court out of which execution or order au-
thorizing the sale was issued, and at the same time file with 
the court a petition setting forth the item or items de-
manded to which he objects, together with his grounds of 
objection; and thereupon the court shall enter an order 
fixing a time for hearing of such objections. A copy of 
the petition and order fixing time for hearing shall be 
served on the purchaser not less than two days before the 
day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the 
court shall enter an order determining the amount re-
quired for redemption." 
Daggett County Development Corporation not only 
failed to take advantage of the foregoing provision, it paid 
the full amount requested without protest and did nothing 
further until after the lower court had held the hearing on 
the motion of Appellants Amoss to set aside the sheriff's 
sale — approximately four months after the redemption 
had been made. 
In no way can it be said that Daggett County De-
velopment Corporation has brought itself within the pro-
visions of either Rule 24(a) (relating to intervention as a 
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matter of right) or Rule 24(b) (relating to permissive in-
tervention). 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS AMOSS, HAVING ASSIGNED 
ANY INTEREST THEY MAY HAVE IN THE 
PROPERTY TO DAGGETT COUNTY DE-
VELOPMENT CORPORATION, HAVE N O 
FURTHER INTEREST IN THE MATTER 
AND THEREFORE N O CAUSE TO COM-
P M J N . 
Inasmuch as this is an action to foreclose a mortgage 
and there has been no attempt to take a deficiency judg-
ment against Appellants Amoss, Appellants have no fur-
ther interest in the litigation since they have long since 
assigned their interest in the property to Daggett County 
Development Corporation. 
Whether such assignment was made before or after 
the sale appears of little significance. Appellant Dudley 
Amoss was present at the sale and failed to bid in his own 
right. Instead, he attempted to bid on behalf of Daggett 
County Development Corporation. (R. 97) His bid, how-
ever, was not for cash but on an installment or future 
payment basis which the sheriff refused. (R. 97) Respond-
ents, on the other hand, bid the full amount of the in-
debtedness; and there being no other or better bids, it was 
accepted. (R. 97) 
It seems odd that Appellant Dudley Amoss would bid 
for Daggett County Development Corporation unless he 
had already assigned his interest to such corporation; but 
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certainly after doing so, he cannot now come in this Court 
in the same action and claim any irregularity in the sale. 
Cases cited in Appellants' brief in support of right 
to appeal have reference to the payor's or judgment debt-
or's right to appeal and are not persuasive in the present 
case where the judgment debtor assigned his right to re-
deem, and redemption by the assignee has already taken 
place. 
SUMMARY 
We respectfully submit that the motion of Appel-
lants Amoss to set aside the sheriff's sale was properly 
denied, and the motion of Daggett County Development 
Corporation to intervene was likewise properly denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Randall L. Romrell 
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN 
AND HENRIOD 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
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